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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

PLO, GUINEA COOPERATION AGREEMENT--Brother Commander Abu 'Ammar [Yasar 'Arafat] received a reply message of greetings and solidarity from Guinean President Hamed Sekou Toure expressing his pride in the heroic battle fought by the Palestinian revolutionaries in confrontation of the Zionist designs. The Guinean President affirmed his country's firm support against all the savage Zionist attacks against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples. He also expressed Guinea's support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people to regain their full national rights. Brother Commander Abu 'Ammar sent a message to the Guinean President. The message was conveyed by Brother Abu 'Ala', director of the Samid Institution, who is currently on a tour of several African countries to deliver messages from Brother Commander Abu 'Ammar to the heads of these states on the glorious Palestinian-Israeli war. During his visit to the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, Brother Abu 'Ala' signed a general agreement for technical, scientific, cultural and economic cooperation between Guinea and the PLO. [Text] [JN211709 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1615 GMT 21 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/145

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SIGNIFICANCE OF PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CEASE-FIRE ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 232, 1 Aug 81 pp 26-28

[Article by Fu'ad Matar: "The War of Recognition: The Cease-Fire Agreement: Facts, Question Marks and Riddles"]

[Text] It is almost the first time in the history of military confrontations between two parties that a cease-fire agreement, the one that was achieved between Palestinians and Israelis, appears to have the importance of a major agreement rather than being merely a transitory agreement required by the feuding parties so they can get a measure of rest.

This agreement has affirmed few facts; it has explained few riddles; and it left a few question marks on the horizon. Examples of these facts, riddles and question marks may be found in the following lines.

First, the day on which U.S. envoy Philip Habib announced the Palestinian-Israeli cease-fire agreement is a principal date in the course of Palestinian action on both the military and political fronts. In the future, 24 July 1981 will be increasingly remembered when Palestinian steps are discussed and decisions made. In the course of analyzing actions in the future, it will be said that Palestinian action before 24 July was such and that it became such after 24 July. The same thing may be said of Arab and international dealings with the Palestinian question.

If one may say so, the method that was utilized in announcing the agreement was breathtaking and dumbfounding. The agreement showed that diplomacy was capable of achieving a great deal, especially if it is the kind of diplomacy that Philip Habib [has demonstrated]. It is a diplomacy that is based on saying little and enduring setbacks.

The agreement is "Carradonian," somewhat after Lord Carradon. However, measured against present conditions that are being experienced in the Middle East area, the 24 July 1981 agreement for a Palestinian-Israeli cease fire seems more advanced and clearer than [UN] Resolution 242. Countries of the area had spent years arguing over the question of "occupied territories" or "the occupied territories." The agreement is also not based on a conspiratorial principle like that which Dr Henry Kissinger

utilized and which produced the formula for the Camp David accords. Had that principle been conspiratorial, the Palestine Liberation Organization would not have accepted it.

Accordingly, the agreement does not mean the end of the Palestinian-Israeli war, even though it is possible to assume that it is the most advanced step that has been taken [so far] in the area of non-military dealing with the Arab-Israeli struggle by the two principal parties in this struggle: the Palestine Liberation Organization and the "state of Israel."

The purpose behind saying that the agreement does not mean the end of the Palestinian-Israeli war is that the clashes may be resumed and the Israeli and Palestinian parties may go back to shelling each other again. Every time the Palestinian-Israeli war flares up, a call for a cease-fire will be made. Thus, from time to time--and this may have been what the creator of the agreement had in mind--the increase in the clashes and accordingly, the increase in the number of cease fire agreements will in time and in the not too distant future lead to [the formation of] a disengagement committee and [the setting up of] a tent inside which those who will formulate a disengagement agreement will sit.

Second, it is noteworthy that the U.S. envoy announced the cease-fire agreement when he was in Israel. This strengthens the agreement. As to why the announcement was made in Israel and how that would strengthen the agreement, the following may be said about these two questions:

The United States of America does not recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as an entity and an organization representing the Palestinian people. In the absence of such recognition the U.S. envoy was energetic in [his efforts] to ensure that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would guarantee Palestinian acceptance of the cease-fire in addition to Syria's nonopposition to it. The U.S. envoy announced the agreement after obtaining these assurances. He did not announce the agreement from Beirut because it was Israel and the Palestinian Resistance that were exchanging the gunfire, and Beirut is the capital of the Lebanese state. In addition, Mr Yasir 'Arafat, president of the liberation organization had already announced, following the extremely brutal Israeli attack on Palestinian centers in Beirut and the south, the beginning of the Palestinian-Israeli war.

The U.S. envoy also did not announce the cease-fire agreement from Damascus despite the fact that there are cease-fire agreements between Syria and Israel. He did not make the announcement from Jiddah or from Riyadh either so as to keep the matter in a Palestinian-Israeli framework. Had the liberation organization had a capital, the announcement would have been made from two places and not only from Israel. It is known that announcing the agreement from Israel is in one form or another an affirmation of the fact that Israel is the aggressor. But the organization does not have a capital; it rather has places in Beirut, Tyre and al-Nabatiyah. An announcement coming from one of those places would indicate that the notion of settling the Palestinians there was imminent.

It may be said, "Would it not have been better had the announcement of a cease-fire been made at the United Nations by the secretary general of the international organization, Dr Kurt Waldheim, instead of having the announcement come in that form?"

Such a statement would be true if the purpose was to keep the matter within its neutral framework and away from the United States. However, a cease-fire would not have occurred in such a case. It is no secret to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to the Arab countries that the United States wants the solution to the Middle East problem to be an American solution in one form or another.

Thus, any agreement that would have been reached without the United States would not have seen the light. Agreements that are sponsored by the United Nations and the resolutions that are issued by the international organization are not approved by Israel. Therefore, they remain useless.

Third, the 24 July 1981 agreement is the first cease-fire agreement between the Palestinian and Israeli parties since the second stage of the Palestinian Revolution began in 1965. The first stage was in the late forties and early fifties. The agreement, however, does not prohibit the Palestinian Resistance from launching operations inside occupied Palestine. Nor does the agreement prevent Israel from pursuing nationalist and revolutionary elements inside the country. The 24 July agreement stipulates that "any hostile military action between Israeli and Lebanese territory on both sides" be stopped. However, the method which international media agencies used to present the news of the agreement suggests that much development will take place so that the agreement will become a cornerstone in the peace process or the cornerstone itself. U.S. and European newspapers headlined the agreement on their front pages, and news of the agreement prefaced news bulletins on radio and television.

This general agreement to consider the news extremely important signifies that there is an international willingness in the media to accept the formula of a solution that may develop in the future in the light of the 24 July agreement. When we say this we do not rule out of consideration the fact that the international agencies of the media which go along with Israel--either because of sympathy or pressure--gave news of the agreement prominence to suggest that Israel wants peace and that the evidence for that lay in the fact that it agreed to stop its raids on the Palestinians in Lebanon. But this does not at all eliminate the feelings of anxiety that welled in the hearts of international media agency officials as they saw films of the terror that spread among the residents of Israeli areas which were shelled by the Palestinian Resistance from Lebanese territories.

This leads us to say that Menahem Begin did not agree to the cease-fire so as to go along with the administration of President Reagan and his envoy to the area, Philip Habib. If he wanted to go along with them, he would have done so before. Begin agreed to the cease-fire because the ability of the Palestinians to fire their missiles continuously against the residents of the Galilee area, despite the brutality of the Israeli response, spoiled

Begin's considerations and propositions, making his threats somewhat flat. It is true that what happened to the residents of the Galilee area does not add up to one part in a million of what happened to the residents of the areas of (al-Fakihani), al-Nabatiyah, Tyre and the remaining areas of Lebanon where Palestinians can be found, but the Palestinian missiles nevertheless had a considerable effect. In addition, the ability of the Palestinian Resistance to continue shelling al-Matallah and al-Nahariyah was somewhat unsettling to Begin. If this may be said, Philip Habib did descend on Begin at the right moment. Dr Henry Kissinger, for example, would not have done that because Kissinger was loyal to himself first, to his Jewish faith second, and to the United States after that. Philip Habib, however, is not overly concerned with himself, but he is extremely loyal to the United States. In addition, he is a devout Christian.

Thus Begin agreed to the cease-fire after he failed to create an official Lebanese situation that would be responsive to an agreement with Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. He agreed to the cease-fire agreement after he felt or was made to feel or was informed that the Reagan administration was prepared to abandon him. This however would not signify that it was abandoning Israel, especially since Begin had just come out of an election campaign and the United States was able to make this semi-victory shrink little by little.

President Reagan may have been convinced that it was necessary to exert pressure on Israel because the shelling that the Palestinian areas were subjected to in Beirut and south Lebanon was carried out with American weapons and because Begin, who had been overbearing with the U.S. secretary of state, Alexander Haig, may be overbearing with Reagan himself. If finding solutions that would be somewhat balanced were easy before such behavior against the president of the United States were to take place, such solutions would no longer be simple at all if Begin presumes upon the president.

It may become evident in the future that Philip Habib became aware of this and that he told his president in one way or another something to signify that this was the suitable opportunity for creating a break in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and that if pressure had to be exerted, it would have to be exerted now before Begin forms the government because the formation of the government without a negative position from President Reagan's administration on what Begin did--beginning with the raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and ending with the brutal raids on the Palestinian areas in Beirut and south Lebanon--would signify that this government will be aggressive only, and there would be no place for any effort to achieve peace in the area with an aggressive Israeli government.

Fourth, the Palestinian-Israeli cease fire agreement took place at a time when a Soviet plan that was not agreeable to the United States and its traditional friends in the area had made good progress. This plan suggests that as long as the Palestinians are staying in Lebanon, as long as Israel is engaged in a genocidal or semi-genocidal operation against them, as long as the United States is not deterring Israel from its aggression and as

long as the Arab countries are in a position of not being able to oppose Israel collectively--as long as the situation is what it is--Lebanon then is to enter into a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union. In accordance with this treaty various kinds of missiles bases would be scattered along the coast [of Lebanon] and in the mountains. Let Israel's airplanes then try to fly freely and attack the Palestinians in their camps and bases!

In the past 5 months the Soviets had begun speaking and writing openly and frequently to their friends in the area or to those who were ideologically close to them. The Soviets also began bringing up the subject with Arab officials who were visiting Moscow. Although they brought up the subject indirectly in the course of discussing alternatives to [providing] protection to the Palestinian Revolution and to the progressive forces in Lebanon, [the intent] was perfectly clear to those who were tracking the Soviet plan. One of those visitors relates that a Soviet official said something to the effect that what seems objectionable now may become a demand at a later time. Every aggression carried out by Israel is a pressure factor on the lawful government in Lebanon to make an effort to obtain this treaty.

In this context there is information indicating that the Soviets had placed considerable pressure on President Ilyas Sarkis to accept an invitation they had extended to him to visit Moscow and that because of that pressure the Lebanese president chose to visit the United States so he would not find himself compelled to make two visits.

Had it not been for the Palestinian-Israeli cease-fire agreement, the Soviets' discussion would have broadened. It is to be noted that the discussion did not cease because this agreement was reached.

Fifth, Philip Habib did not outline on paper the stages of a plan he was to implement. Instead, he allowed developments to take their course and bring about those actions that were required. The very harsh words that were said about him and his mission did not stop him, and he did not allow words to affect his emotions.

It may be said that Philip Habib was one of those persons who was most relieved by the gross error committed by Israel when its airplanes conducted their brutal raids against the areas where Palestinians can be found in Beirut and south Lebanon. He was also one of the people who was most delighted because the Palestinian Resistance had responded on a continuous basis. Had it not been for that response, he would not have been able to come up with the formula, which despite the nebulous method that was used in announcing it, is the formula for a future solution. The agreement affirms that the Israeli war machinery recognizes that of the Palestinians and vice versa. What is important in view of current circumstances is that any recognition does take place. It is known that such recognition will evolve so that [eventually] there would be mutual recognition of who fired the shots, of the motives behind firing the shots and so on.

What is even more important than this is the fact that the Palestinian-Israeli cease-fire agreement will encourage President Reagan to give priority to the Middle East crisis. It may [even] encourage his administration to recognize the PLO unless this administration prefers to recognize the organization after Israel recognizes it. In doing so the Reagan administration would be like most of the Arab countries which do not seem willing to acknowledge the Israeli status quo before the organization does so.

The cease-fire agreement has invalidated some cases of the ongoing debate about who represents the Palestinian people because the Palestinian party in the 24 July agreement was the PLO and not any other Palestinian party. Besides, the organization accepted the agreement from a position of power and not only from the position of a party whose rights had been usurped. Accordingly, the power and influence of the organization's position will increase if Palestinians, Arabs and Soviets rally around it instead of the possibility of a rally around it by some of them. In any case this is the position that will endure, despite everything that will stand in its way, because it is a blend of two positions: that of the Palestinian Revolution and that of the Palestinian state.

On the basis of the current political and psychological Arab situation and on the basis of the international equations that do not appear to be capable of change, this is the position that will win the support of the vast majority of Arabs whose support will be the same as that which they gave the Resistance in the aftermath of the 1967 defeat.

8592
CSO: 4304/122

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

FRENCH WEEKLY V.S.D. ON JOINT PLO, SOVIET PLAN

TA210742 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 21 Aug 81 p 2

[Report by France-based correspondent Gid'on Qotz]

[Text] Paris (special for DAVAR)--The Soviet Union and the PLO have agreed on a plan to set up a Palestinian government-in-exile and a regular Palestinian army. The V.S.D. weekly, which quotes Western intelligence sources, states that this plan will increase the danger of war in the Middle East in the coming months. The phases of the plan concluded during Yasir 'Arafat's visit to Moscow in June are as follows:

A. Disbanding the PLO and its military branch the Fatah and setting up a Palestinian government-in-exile which will demand the territories occupied in 1967 as the first stage in the disappearance of Israel.

B. A Palestinian Army will later be set up and this will contain tank, armored and air force units. The name of this military force will be "Jaysh Tahrir Falastin"--the army for the liberation of Palestine.

The man who was appointed by Moscow to organize the army is Ibrahim Shiraq. He was born in Azerbaijan, was a cadet of the Moscow Military Academy and trained in the Crimea and East Berlin. In the past he was used by the Soviets in Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. In Lebanon he succeeded in forming a force of three divisions and organized about 30,000 to 40,000 Palestinians. As for the air force, the weekly notes it will be named "Force 14" and will contain MiG-17 and MiG-21 planes. The weekly reports that the training of Palestinian pilots has already begun.

C. The Palestinian government will later gain recognition by Moscow, Eastern bloc countries and several countries in Asia. Its embassy will also open in Moscow in September.

According to the paper, the Israeli attack on Beirut was a reaction to knowledge about the forming of the Palestinian army. Also according to the paper, 84 Palestinian technicians and communications experts were killed and another 175 were wounded. Since Israel could not massively invade Lebanon the Palestinian army was saved.

CSO: 4323/59

BACKGROUND OF WAKHAN PROVINCE ANNEXATION DISCUSSED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 31 Aug 81 pp 122-124

[Article: "Historic Gift--Has Kabul Ceded Its Strategically Important North to the Soviet Union in a Secret Treaty? Indications Are That It Has"]

[Text] The report of the TASS news agency was strikingly brief and vague:

"On 16 June in Kabul [?a treaty] was signed between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan about the course of the national boundary from the western shore of the Sorkul Lake to the Powalo-Shvaykovskiy summit. The treaty legally insures the existing guarded Soviet-Afghan border line in this area."

The Kremlin maintains silence about any detail in the treaty concerning the extreme northern tip of Afghanistan, which in the north borders on the Soviet Union, in the south on Pakistani Kashmir, and in the east--for only 87 kilometers--on China, and about why the treaty was needed in the first place. All the more vociferous was the Chinese leadership on the subject.

A protest by the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared the "border rectification agreement" concluded between Moscow and Kabul "illegal and void" because it "comprises the area of the Pamir in dispute between China and the Soviet Union."

This area of more than 20,000 square kilometers, "as was well known," had been "occupied by force of arms by czarist Russian imperialism in 1892 and since that time "no Chinese government (had) recognized the illegal occupation and domination."

There was a quick Soviet rejoinder. In mid-August the Foreign Ministry in Moscow stated coolly that "questions regulated by this treaty are the business only of the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and no one else's." China's claims had been "invented," what with the border in that sector having "originated historically" and having been "secured by an exchange of notes in the year 1894."

The big Afghan finger called Wakhan, more than 200 kilometers long, comprising only 300 square kilometers and protruding from the Hindu Kush at a height of more than 7,000 meters into the plateau of the Pamir Mountains, has all along been of the greatest strategic value.

The descendants of Genghis Khan in the 13th century penetrated in Persia and southern Europe across the frozen pass, and in the opposite direction Marco Polo found his way to the legendary treasures of Kambalik, today's Peking.

Into our times the mountain landscape populated only sparsely by Kirgiz nomadic tribes has remained a beaten path between Occident and Orient.

It was so also when late last century the Russians, British and Chinese fought for domination of the bleak area. In its expeditions of conquest in central Asia czarist cavalry forces had advanced into what is now Tadzhikistan, and Britain perceived this as a threat to its empire in India and in the semicolonial Afghanistan counted as part of India.

The Chinese had just newly conquered the Province of Sinkiang and, to the horror of the emir of Afghanistan, were preparing to extend their rule to west of the Pamir.

London had Indian troops march against the mountain tribes already under control of the Chinese. Against the more dangerous push for expansion by the czar, whose forces were camouflaged as scientific expeditions, the only help was diplomacy.

In two treaties, in 1873 and 1894, the monarchs in London and St Petersburg agreed to respect the Wakhan corridor as a buffer between Russia and the British colonial empire--under the territorial sovereignty of the emir of Afghanistan, who was dependent on Britain.

China was invited neither to the negotiations nor to become a member of the border commission; cowed after the Opium War, it was not considered respectable by the courts in England and Russia.

Thus in fact no Chinese government consented to the border line--until 1963, when China and Afghanistan concluded a border treaty valid to this day. As Peking stressed expressly in its latest protest note to Moscow, it has "no territorial problems" with Pakistan.

Afghanistan's communists, however, had serious problems with the Wakhan province as early as 1978, when they assumed power in a bloody coup in Kabul. Hardly delighted by any red rule, the Kirgiz tribes living in the corridor left the country and fled to Pakistan.

Even then partisans made themselves at home in the deserted valleys. Particularly the guerrillas of the Chinese-supported Afghan Maoist movement "Shola-i-Jawid" (Eternal Flame) obtained an ideal basis of operations against the changing leftist rulers in Kabul.

According to high-ranking Afghan military men, the tightly organized and well armed Maoists also triggered the decision for Moscow's winter invasion.

It is said that documents were found on nine partisans taken prisoner in the Wakhan area in late November 1979 proving a plan by the Afghan President Amin, who was overthrown and killed a little later, to take up contacts with Chinese and U.S. offices, and this is what Moscow wanted to prevent.

What is sure is that, as a first Soviet wave of invasion, a whole airborne division occupied Wakhan in late December, encountering embittered resistance on the part of about 700 rebels of the "Eternal Flame."

Despite great losses on both sides, this resistance has not been removed to this day. Nor has the forced settlement of Tadzhik families from the Soviet Union in the deserted villages of the Kirgiz who had fled from the area made for greater security in the border province.

Several times and without any success so far, the Soviet occupiers in the mountainous corridor have tried above all to cut the supply lines for the Afghan rebels from China and Pakistan—there being ample military strategic reasons at least to block Afghanistan from China.

There is something even more important: if, as Pakistani papers claim, the Soviets have annexed Wakhan through the new treaty, it would mean that they have advanced to within 80 kilometers of the strategically important Karakorum highway connecting Pakistan with China. This mountain highway was built by the Chinese at enormous financial sacrifice 10 years ago.

As early as last November the Pakistan paper DAWN OVERSEAS had warned against the danger of an annexation. A number of peculiar indications prior to the signing of the treaty hardened the suspicion.

Thus the "legal insuring" of the border which is given as the reason for the mysterious conclusion of the treaty by the Kremlin had been accomplished by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union already in a treaty in 1946, in which the Soviet Union even insisted on an exact delineation of the border at the Amu Darya river (the center of the river).

In addition, Moscow's governor, Afghan President Karmal, was summoned to Moscow for a secret visit two weeks before the conclusion of the treaty, with neither Moscow nor Kabul reporting the meeting.

One month later Karmal again traveled to the Soviet Union to meet Soviet party chief Brezhnev in the Crimea. In the process, the Afghan agency AFGHAN PRESS reported in Kabul, he delivered "a document about the Wakhan region."

Radio Kabul described the document as a "historic present by Karmal," and the Pakistani paper DAWN claims that Karmal donated to the Lenin Museum in Moscow a copy of the Wakhan treaty as a "tribute to the Russian October Revolution."

In the course of this, according to the Pakistani paper, the director of the museum reportedly also showed Karmal documents about the fate of Wakhan hailing "from the time of the regime" of Karmal's murdered predecessors Taraki and Amin.

Whatever the secret border treaty may contain, it appears in any case to be a pawn of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis China's friend Pakistan.

For the first time since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, last week a Kremlin leader, Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin, traveled to Islamabad to win Pakistan over for a political solution of the Afghanistan question on Moscow's pattern.

8790

CSO: 4620/12

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

BAHRAINI DECREES--An amiri decree has been issued establishing a new department in the Public Works, Electricity and Water Ministry. It will be called the Financial and Administrative Department for Electricity and Water Affairs. Another amiri decree has been issued establishing a Bahraini shareholding company that will be known as the Bahrain Telecommunications Company. [CF131244 Manama Domestic Service in Arabic 1030 GMT 13 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/148

HEAD OF ARMY REVOLUTION COURTS COMMENTS ON BANI-SADR'S FLIGHT

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 3 Aug 81 p 2

[Text] Hojjat Ol-Eslam Mohammadi Reyshahri, Religious judge and Head of the Military Courts of the Islamic Revolution, commented on Bani-Sadr's conduct and position connected with the organizational systems of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Military Revolutionary Courts and his flight, while talking to the reporters.

Head of the Military Courts said: "In general, Bani-Sadr wanted to promote the spirit of cult of individual within the army. To achieve this objective of his, he had been engaged in a series of activities, which were known to us. He wanted to have a strong support within the army for his rainy days. Fortunately, the army proved its loyalty to the nation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Bani-Sadr, on the other hand, with his flight together with Mas'ud Rajavi, proved that he has never been a supporter of the army, for the Mojahedi were opposed to the army from the beginning."

He added: "Bani-Sadr had always claimed that he was a supporter and the father of the army, and tried to show that in case of his removal, there would be no one else to support the army. However, we have seen that after his removal from his post as commander in chief, the battlefronts have been more organized, and the warriors have fought with more coordination and improved morale."

Hojjatol-Escam Reyshahri added: "Bani-Sadr's another failure was that he attracted the dropouts and unfits in the army, and he did the same in his office. Then, whenever he faced difficulties, he blamed the Revolutionary Courts, the Islamic Council, and the Political-Idealogical Offices of the Army. Though he himself had selected the members of the board for purging the army. However, as this board did not comply with his wishes, he dissolved it, and attributed the purges to the military courts and the clergy. At the same time, he was reinstating those who had been purged. He always supported the SAVAK agents, and military defectors, and prevented the severance of their pensions."

Regarding the trial of Admiral Alavi, Bani-Sadr said: "I should be the only person to review his file. If I consider him to be guilty, then you can arrest him. Furthermore, he supported Gen Bagheri, Commander of the Air Force, in the same way. However, the court was neither influenced nor intimidated by him,

and continued its work. Bani-Sadr also refrained from signing the orders that required the signature of the Commander-in-Chief. To this effect, there exist many documents. Contrary to Article 172 of the Constitution, he initiated the formation of wartime tribunals.

Regarding Bani-Sadr's opposition to the Islamic Republican Regime, Hojjatol-Islam Mohammadi Reyshahri, religious judge and head of the Army courts said: "Almost 11 months ago by means of a limited number of competent persons still existing in Bani-Sadr's office, we were informed that he was planning to hold a referendum for altering the Constitution. According to the same reports, after the referendum he was planning to put Dr Beheshti and other officials of the Islamic Republic on trial."

Bani-Sadr's Flight

Regarding Banisadr's flight, the religious judge and head of the Army Revolution Courts said: "Presently, there are two teams investigating this case. Investigations are incomplete, however, God willing, at the next interview, the results will be made public."

He said: "In connection with this flight, so far seven persons have been arrested. What I can mention at this moment is that Bani-Sadr had probably been hiding in the environs of the airport for two days prior to his flight. Also, at the time of the take-off, two ambulances had been noticed close to the aircraft, one of them presumably having Bani-Sadr's wife on board, who has left the country with him."

Col Mo'ezzi

Referring to Col Behzad Mo'ezzi, Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri said: "Based on the report prepared for martyr Dr Chamran, which he submitted to the military court while he was still alive, the court discharged Col Mo'ezzi on [27 July '80]. Immediately after the imposed war broke out between Iran and Iraq, he was reinstated by Bani-Sadr. According to the report submitted to martyr Chamran, Mo'ezzi had full support of the Shah and SAVAK. He was the Shah's private pilot, he flew the Shah from Iran to Morocco, received gifts before and after this trip, sold his house and household effects before the departure of the Shah, and purchased a house in the United States. After his return, he said that he was going to Palestine. He took 45 days of leave, and instead, he went to the United States. After a while he was appointed commander of the Seventh base in Shiraz, despite the former commander's efficient performance. During Mo'ezzi's assignment at the base disunity became evident among the personnel, and contrary to orders, he formed phony council, following the path of the Mojahedin."

After the elections, all appointments and assignments took place on the instructions of the group that guided him. In this report, there are tens of other issues, such as his close relations with Rajavi, taking of long-wave radios out of the country, and other illegal activities that cannot be mentioned here.

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MUSTAFA DUDIN DISCUSSES WEST BANK SITUATION

Biography Given

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 26 Jul-1 Aug 81 p 8

[Text]

MUSTAFA DUDEEN

Mustafa Dudeen is a native of Dura, a central village in the Hebron district of the West Bank, where he owns over 3000 dunums of land. He is from a tribal clan of 3000, of which the Dudeen: hamula is 1000 strong. One of his brothers was a former military governor of Gaza, when it was under Egyptian rule; a second brother assists him as 'agricultural consultant' with the Village League. He has been married three times and has a total of 16 children. His six children from his first marriage, which ended in divorce, have openly denounced their father's political activities.

In 1944, Dudeen joined the Palestine Police under the British Mandate. Close associates who knew him during this period discount that he ever held communist beliefs prior to the creation of the Israeli state. From 1945 to 1965, Dudeen was in the employ of the Egyptian government, working with the intelligence branch in the Palestinian affairs department. During the 1948 war he travelled with the Egyptian army to Gaza.

Dudeen was vehemently opposed to the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank in the aftermath of the war. He changed his colours when Jordan, which was anxious to have Palestinians in its government, offered him a ministerial level position as chairman of a co-operative organization. As head of the Jordanian government institution, he approved agricultural loans in Jordan, including the West Bank. He stayed in the job for four years until, under the

patronage of his good friend Prime Minister Wasfi Tel, he was given the post of Minister of Social Welfare in 1969.

When King Hussein's army massacred the Fedayeen in Jordan in 1970, Dudeen participated in the battle at Taibeh village south of Amman — on the side of the Hashemite kingdom. Twenty-seven young people from Dudeen's hometown of Dura were killed in the battle. Dudeen dragged himself still farther down in the estimation of his fellow Palestinians by fulfilling an obligation to invite Prime Minister Tel to a victory lunch in Taibeh.

After Wasfi Tel's assassination, Dudeen lost the influence he once had in Amman. He was made head of Hussein's National Arab Unity Party but it ended in failure after a life of one year. Fully adopted by the Hashemite regime, Mustafa Dudeen was next appointed Jordan's ambassador to Kuwait. He served for one year before being recalled to Amman, reportedly at the request of the Kuwait government for reasons that have not been made public.

Dudeen's final political post for Jordan was a Parliament appointment from 1973-1975. After serving the British, Egyptian and Jordanian governments against the Palestinian people, Dudeen finally returned home to Dura after his wife's family reunion application, his political fortunes almost run out.

In 1976 Dudeen engineered to run a bloc in the municipal elections. Locals say the bloc was formed of a group of traditional leaders with no ideology," which failed miserably. One year later Dudeen resurfaced with the Village League scheme, backed this time by Israeli occupation authorities.

Mustafa Dudeen is known as an intelligent, wealthy man, whose motivation is not material riches but political influence. Opponents of the League feel Dudeen's newest schemings carry little weight. What is far worse, they feel, are Dudeen's collaborations with Wasfi Tel's pogrom against the Palestinian people. To this day, Dura, home village of many he martyred, has refused to join the Village League.

'AL-FAJR Interviews Dudin

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 26 Jul-1 Aug 81 pp 8, 14

[Text]

Dudeen: This association called Hebron Villages Association was established in 1978. We are considered a central association dealing with the needs of these villages, trying to improve the lives of these villagers. According to law, the municipalities are responsible only for the cities and they are not in charge of the villages.

The villages in the area here have been very poor and undeveloped for hundreds of years.

Al Fajr: Are they poorer than other villages in the West Bank?

Dudeen: Yes, yes, because there is no real income after they lost all their land in '48 or '67. They all were depending on agriculture, which they lost. Their income now comes from their daily labour in Israel. In the short time of two years we have carried out many projects to make these villages much better than before. We are planning to make a master plan for all these villages to cover all their needs.

Al Fajr: How many villages are in the league?

Dudeen: The population of this area is about 200,000. 120,000 are villagers in 60 villages, and 80,000 in Hebron.

Al Fajr: So what can the village league do, for example, that the Hebron municipality cannot do?

Dudeen: They cannot carry out any project beyond the city boundaries. Anyone who needs help comes here and we will help them.

Al Fajr: What kinds of things do people ask you to do?

Dudeen: Mainly for villages, we deal with projects. Or if they have problems we try to help them.

Al Fajr: You act, then, as a kind of municipality?

Dudeen: I want you to understand that there is no misunderstanding between them and us. We are cooperating in civil fields. We don't deal with politics at all. The mayors, some of them deal with politics. We don't deal with politics, our relations prevent us from it. All our activities are geared towards the community, the social and economic needs of ourselves only.

Al Fajr: What is an example of something political which you can't deal with?

Dudeen: None in this area except the occupation. Really, none in this area. But we believe that political activity should be carried by those who are in charge of politics.

* * *

Al Fajr: What, for example, does the education committee do?

Dudeen: We make a survey of the area, how many schools need libraries. This year we built 13 schools.

Al Fajr: Public Health must be expensive. Where do you get your money?

Dudeen: In our association we have no money. We are a link between the village councils, the governor and the people.

The government paid 50 percent of the cost. For the other 50 percent, the people collect money. Some of them get help from the Jordanian government, so they cover the other 50 percent.

Al Fajr: Do you get funds from the Joint Committee? What percentage?

Dudeen: The total sum given to villages in Hebron at this minute is JD 110,000. Most of the villages receive JD 10-20,000.

Arab countries give US \$150 million to the Joint Committee, but people in the West Bank have not received more than JD 3.5 million. We have 80 village councils in the West Bank and the Joint Committee has decided to give every council JD 40,000. Out of the 80 I think 50 have taken it. The others were not given money because some of them bought electricity from the Israeli company. The rest of the money was given to small villages which do not have councils or committees. I believe not more than \$10 million was given to the West Bank out of that money.

Al Fajr: Where is the rest of the money going?

Dudeen: I don't know. One village or small town in Jordan receives more money than a district in the West Bank.

Al Fajr: What kind of relationship do you have with the military authority. It must be a very delicate situation?

Dudeen: We have no special relationship with the government but we are preparing the projects for our villages and we sit together with the Technical Committee in the governorship here, discuss the projects and when they are approved, we proceed.

Al Fajr: You said those villages governments which receive money from Amman have their budgets supplemented by the military by 50 percent. Those that don't receive money get 80 percent?

Muhammed Nasr, the Leagues's Technical Advisor: This is only in the Hebron district. And this has been achieved by this association because we are always trying to invite the generals and the big responsible men into this government. They have visited our villages...

Al Fajr: Who has?

Nasr: General Matt (Israeli Officer responsible for the occupied territories) visited three or four times in this area. And the ex-Defense Minister Mr. Weizmann, he visited this association here.

Al Fajr: Do they approve of the association?

Nasr: They have approved it. And the governor-general also approves it.

Al Fajr: How much money has the military government given the league?

Nasr: Given who?

Al Fajr: To the village league...

Nasr: To the village league? To the villagers or to the village league? Actually they don't pay the money to us.

Al Fajr: They don't give it to you, they just give it directly to the village councils?

Nasr: They pay it directly to the village councils. We don't receive the money and distribute it. No, we recommend that this village has finished such a project and they submit their invoices to us and when we approve, we send the invoices to the government and then they pay according to the invoices or according to the tenders. If the village gives a tender of, suppose, 1 million, then the government pays 50 percent of that tender.

Al Fajr: Has the military government ever refused to fund a project?

Nasr: They have never refused to pay for any approved project.

Al Fajr: Have they ever refused to approve a project? Can you think of any?

Nasr: To date, no. The people give us the projects, and we approve them here in the office.

Al Fajr: Do you have a 'Joint Committee' of the league and the military government?

Nasr: Yes. Locally it consists of me and the governor.

Al Fajr: The Joint Committee is you and the military governor? That's the Joint Committee?

Nasr: This is the local joint committee. Our technical committee is Mr. Dudeen, myself and the head of the council. If a village has a project, then the head of the council is a member of this committee. He attends and we talk, and when we ask him some questions he is a member of the committee.

Al Fajr: The joint committee, then, is the military governor and his assistant, you and Mr. Dudeen, head of the council and a member of the relevant committee — education, engineering, etc. How often do you meet with the military authority?

Dudeen: According to the law we should have their approval before we start a project. We meet them when we have projects to discuss. Therefore we inform them when we have several projects in villages so and so. And we cooperate with them to fix the time and the date when we can meet, usually within a week or 10 days.

Al Fajr: But the village league is responsible, then, for a very wide area. This is seen as legal by the military authority?

Dudeen: Yes, this is legal because it is according to the village association's regulations. And we were established according to the law.

You know before we had this we were 140,000 people out of 200,000 living in the Hebron area. So we are living in scattered groups and small villages. There is no other way to serve the people unless we make a central association for giving good services to these people.

Al Fajr: What about issues such as land confiscation in the area that affects some

of these 60 villages that you are responsible for? Do you protest on their behalf to the military authorities when there are land confiscations for settlements?

Dudeen: Till now we have had no problems like this except for a small place in one village which we are discussing with the military authorities.

Al Fajr: Is that the only case of land confiscation in the last two years?

Dudeen: Yes.

Al Fajr: What is your relationship with the Jordanian government?

Dudeen: We are citizens of Jordan. We are natives, we are citizens. You know here in the West Bank is a part of Jordan. Until now the laws of Jordan are still operative in the area.

Al Fajr: You consider yourselves Jordanian citizens?

Dudeen: Yes, yes. And (I) was a minister in the Jordanian cabinet.

Al Fajr: How do you feel about a state on the West Bank? Would you like to see one federated with Jordan or an independent state?

Dudeen: Of course this land will never be isolated from Jordan. For every Palestinian family, half remained here and half are on the eastern bank of the Jordan. There cannot be isolation.

Historically it is one country.

Al Fajr: Are you against an independent West Bank state?

Dudeen: We are not against that. Maybe we will choose such a thing.

Yes, we could be independent, within Jordan...

We do not like to put the carriage in front of the horse.

WEST BANK VILLAGE EXPERIENCES PROBLEMS

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 2-8 Aug 81 p 11

[Article by Majedeh el-Butsch: "Hizma's Sewage Woes"]

[Text]

Hizma lies north-east of Jerusalem, barely visible from the main highway to Ramallah. There has been a village on the site since ancient times. Archaeologists have found Canaanite remains. During Byzantine times a church was constructed in the village, it was found recently during excavations in that area for Roman remains. An ancient mosque dates back 1,500 years to the very beginning of the Arab era in Palestine.

Modern Hizma, like other villages in the West Bank, struggles to maintain its integrity in the face of progressive land confiscation and the obstruction of its development by the occupation. The 2,500 villagers have their homes on 180 dunams, the village's remaining 1,000 dunams have either been grabbed by the settlement of Neve Yakov or are closed to development by military orders.

The occupation authorities have only just decided where Hizma 'belongs.' Villagers were only recently informed that their community falls under the

jurisdiction of Ramallah municipality. Before the Israeli military take over, Jerusalem took municipal responsibility for the area. Since 1967 provision of basic services has fallen on the shoulders of the inhabitants themselves. Garbage, for instance, is not collected, each family has to take responsibility for burning its own. Hizma villagers' plans to take electricity from the Jerusalem Electric Company had to be dropped when the Israelis confiscated the land on which electricity pylons were going to be built. While the JEC tries to draw up new plans villagers have had to fall back on the use of individual generators which they pay for themselves.

Perhaps the most pernicious problem, however, facing the village is Neve Yakov's sewage problem. The Israeli settlement runs its sewage pipes into Hizma land and discharges it into open pools. The fetid pools are a breeding ground for mosquitos and other insects. Locals are also frightened that it could cause cholera problems. Complaints to the Israeli authorities have brought no reply.

Relations with their enforced neighbours are not good. Local herders complain that if they go near the settlement with their flocks they are threatened and assaulted. Before occupation agriculture, stone cutting and raising livestock were the mainstay of the local economy. With the confiscation and restrictions there, local traders have now gone and most workers in Hizma have to travel daily to try and find work in Israeli factories and workshops.

The village has no local council. Relations with the authorities are handled by the 90 year old mukhtar who is aided by his son, local headmaster A'tta Thyab; both reject the village league. Like most small communities in the occupied West Bank Hizma has problems with insufficient health or education services and lack of transport.

A clinic was opened about a year ago by the Women's Work Committee in cooperation with Dr. Ibrahim Dandees, who works three hours a day every day of the week. Members of the local branch of the WWC are treated

free as part of a health insurance scheme included in their membership fees, other residents pay half fees. The 'official' clinic run by the West Bank Health Department only opens once a week. "In emergencies villagers have to head for Ramallah or Jerusalem," said A'tta Thyab.

Transportation is difficult. The local bus company runs buses from the village at 5:00 and 7:00 a.m. for workers. There is then a sporadic two-way service until mid-afternoon, when most labourers return home. Internally, only the main street is paved. A project to level and pave arterial roads is still waiting the permission of the military authorities.

Working for Change

There are only two schools in Hizma, both preparatory. A'tta Thyab points out that there is no provision for children aged six and under and that all secondary education entails travelling to neighbouring towns. On the other hand the village has seen the emergence of self-help social projects in the last year. The Women's Work Committee in Jerusalem has been instrumental in establishing a lit-

eracy and a sewing centre.

About 50 women are involved in projects of the WWC who organize the literacy centre, which runs courses on cultural issues and daily problems as well as basic literacy skills. Today, the project is run by four local instructors. Attached to the centre is a sewing project where local women learn embroidery. The centre's production is sold to local traders and all profits are ploughed back into the project. The Hizma centre paid off its starting loan to the Jerusalem Women's Work Committee after one year. During the feast of al-Fitr the local Women's Work Committee will distribute clothes to poor families in co-ordination with the Jerusalem group.

Hizma has its problems but most locals expect them to be resolved. The present generation has a long history to look back on to draw hope for the future. "They don't scare us," one local shepherd told *Al Fajr*, "this land is ours. It carries the evidence of our ancestors' presence for the last thousand years."

PLANS FOR VILLAGE LEAGUES ASSESSED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 19-25 Jul, 26 Jul-1 Aug, 2-8 Aug 81

[Three part article by Nura Sus, AL-FAJR correspondent]

[19-25 Jul 81 pp 5, 11]

[Text]

This is the first of a 3-part series on the development of the village associations in the West Bank. The association, or *rabeta*, is viewed by its critics as a preliminary structure leading to the imposition of Camp David autonomy.

While the village associations — now numbering three — claim to be simply cooperative organizations dedicated to economic progress in agricultural areas of the West Bank, their powers are more extensive than the elected municipalities. Palestinian nationalists attack the *rabeta* for its direct ties to the military authorities, both financial and political.

The first village association was formed in the Hebron area in 1977 by former Jordanian Minister Mustafa Dudeen. Other organizations created this year in the Ramallah and Bethlehem areas have been modelled after Hebron's. Attempts to form the league in Nablus and Jericho have foundered in the face of almost unanimous popular condemnation.

Sixteen Bethlehem area men, hopeful of forming the third *rabeta* or association of villages, have submitted by-laws to the military authorities for what will surely be prompt approval from the Israelis. The Bethlehem scheme follows by several months the creation of a similar paper association in the Ramallah area. Both are modelled after the three-year-old Hebron village league, managed by

Mustafa Dudeen, a carpetbagging politico who held high government positions in both the Egyptian and Jordanian governments before resettling in the West Bank in 1975.

.... Hebron's Model.....

The association leaders criticise the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee's funding efforts in the occupied territories

and prefer to work instead with the Israeli military authorities, from whom they receive most of their financial support for development projects. In addition to their economic influence over poor southern villages, the association — and the godfather-like figure of Mustafa Dudeen in particular — wields considerable administrative power as well all with the blessing of the occupation authorities. Virtually any permit, project or favour requiring the approval of the military government potentially must go through the hands of the association where it is either obstructed or recommended. According to local sources recommendations are made, for example, for government teaching jobs, or family reunion permits more readily after an exchange of money.

The net effect is that contact between villages and the military government is no longer direct, nor is contact made through nationalist, popularly supported municipalities. Instead the Israeli government has selected, financed and protected their own choice of middlemen.

... From Shoulder Tap ...
..... To Top

Early this year the Hebron association, feeling that they "needed someone to work with in Bethlehem", tapped Bishara Qumsieh for the job. For Qumsieh, a 57-year-old metal factory owner from Beit Sahur, it was the opportunity for public recognition that he had long awaited. As his son Samir proudly tells the story, "Leaders of the 70 villages in the Bethlehem area came to our house and asked my father to lead them."

Father and son gave three reasons for Bishara's ascension to the leadership of the village association in the Bethlehem area. "Bethlehem is predominantly a Christian area so therefore the leader must be a Christian. We believe that this is necessary because of the Holy Places," they explain, although the *rabeta*'s authority would not extend into Bethlehem municipality.

The other criteria are that "the man must have money for himself" and the courage to try to solve "our problems".

The senior Qumsieh claims his league has 10,000 friends, "they all know me and love me," he says. "When they know I am associated with the *rabeta* they shake my hand and say thank you." In another year he expects the number of his friends to swell to 50,000 as word of the good works of the association gets around. These figures are considered wild exaggerations by local residents.

So far, however, the only recognition Qumsieh has received from the Palestinian public is unreserved condemnation from municipal officials and nationalist figures as well as local mukhtars, village councils and refugee camp leaders. The people he has seemed to please, however, are the Israelis. For a Palestinian under military rule, Qumsieh struck a rare pose several weeks ago when he was interviewed on Israel television. (There have also been frequent favourable references to Mustafa Dudeen and his brother Muhammed, the Hebron League's agricultural consultant, on Israeli TV, as well as TV and radio interviews.)

.... Cash From Israel

Bishara Qumsieh explains, "I asked the Arab countries, the Arab League and the Israeli government for (financial) help. Until now only the Israeli government has agreed to help...Now they are our government; it is possible to accept money from Israel."

His main complaint, and chief reason for accepting Dudeen's offer of a 'village league franchise' is a common one in the West Bank: "The Joint Committee money doesn't get down to the people." He is careful to point out that the fault does not lie with the Joint Committee or the PLO. "I don't trust the people here who distribute the money... Bethlehem and Beit Sahur have not done enough for the area. They brought back JD 240,000 from Amman and built houses for themselves," alleges Qumsieh. He does not think the money may be a temptation for the league's associates. "I am straight," he says.

Qumsieh claims to have the support of mukhtars and sheikhs in every village in the Bethlehem area, including even Dheisheh refugee camp, although sources close to *Al Fajr* reported that when the *rabeta* sent over a paper for signature support they were virtually chased out of the camp.

... Bethlehem's Reply....

Bethlehem municipal secretary Jamal Salman also disputes this claim. "All legal representatives of refugee camps, mukhtars, dignitaries and tribesmen around Bethlehem are writing to condemn the league's

formation. The majority of the population in the Bethlehem area condemn the league because we find its intention is to make some cracks in the body of the Palestinian people under occupation."

The municipalities are actively working against the league by calling in villagers who have been contacted and convincing them against extending support. Meanwhile the league, along with their Israeli backers, are busy trying to exploit possible sources of friction among Bethlehem area residents for their favour. For example, arguments that insist the municipalities overlook the needs of the villages, that they take more than their fair share of the \$20 million from the Joint Committee, that Christian-Muslim rivalry in some way accounts for the disproportionate help to the villages — all are enlisted in encouraging supporters. The political overtones are not discussed by the league advocates, however.

Salman sees the league, as do many others, as an undemocratic, anti-nationalist force propped up by the military government for specific political reasons. "The mayors and mun-

icipal officials — elected by the population of the area — all backed by the PLO. The people who make up these leagues are not national factors. The military formed the league to find people who will approve Camp David and Begin's autonomy plan. The outside paint is to help the villages but this is really a political league."

Bishara Qumsieh is circumspect on the issue of Camp David: "We cannot say whether we agree or not." His son repeats that the *rabeta* has not yet been approved — in order to explain his reticence.

So far the *rabeta* in Bethlehem has but the 16 members who put their names on the by-laws, personally submitted at Beit El military headquarters. While the main leaders of the village associations are long experienced in politics and have even run for elected posts, they look to "simple, illiterate, unknown people" for their support. But even among the politically unsophisticated, the *rabeta* is meeting stiff opposition from villagers suspicious of sudden sources of money for projects long neglected under occupation. "We see the carrot," said one resident of Azza-riya, "and look for the stick behind it."

[26 Jul-1 Aug 81 p 9]

[Text]

Mustafa Dudeen is heading up what West Bank national and municipal leaders believe is potentially the most politically dangerous effort yet to substitute autonomy schemes for Palestinian self-determination in the occupied territories. Two months after Sadat's Jerusalem visit and Egypt's overtures to the Israeli state, Mustafa Dudeen — a 20-year veteran of the Egyptian government — began to discuss the idea of forming an association of villages in his native Hebron area.

With important backing from Colonel Mailson, the then Advisor on Arab Affairs to the Military Commander of the occupied territories and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, the Hebron Village Association was established in 1978 within months of Dudeen's initial discussions.

Using the argument that money had been diverted from village development in favor of the cities, Dudeen exploited old rivalries to garner support for his league from traditional notables, mukhtars, heads of families in village councils, governmental appointees and hamlet residents in the economically depressed Hebron district. Slowly he won all the 'front line' villages — those close to the 1967 border — into the association convincing many that the organization had Jordanian blessing. Others were induced to join ranks because of the association's promise to gain quick approval for projects that have been delayed or rejected when requested by the villages directly. Half of the project funding comes through Israeli military sources.

DOUBLE EDGES

Dudeen received steady and stiff opposition from villages that were suspicious of his previous political record (see box) and his current over-friendliness to occupation authorities. While they welcomed development projects — a new road, a much needed school, electricity — they did not want to deal with the military authorities through Dudeen. (The Dura resident, from the outset, has not tried to hide his strong ties to the military authorities. At the time of the league's establishment, he toured the Hebron area villages with Military commander Dani Matt, not a popular figure in the occupied West Bank.)

In 1979 new local councils were appointed in the Hebron district and, not surprisingly, they turned out to be strong supporters of the league. Locals are convinced that all political appointments by the military authorities are made on the recommendation of Mustafa Dudeen, and based on their complicity with Israeli authorities.

ILLEGITIMATE COUNCILS

The majority of Beit Awwa residents have refused to recognize the village's 13-member council, appointed by the military authorities and have stopped paying property taxes. Contrary to the claim of Dudeen on Israeli TV, that the council was chosen in democratic elections, Beit Awwa residents consider the council to be illegal. Council chair Muhammad Mahmoud

Sweity, who is one of three Village League spokesmen, was singled out for special wrath after denouncing the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee on the same Israeli-televised interview. Sweity was apparently taking his revenge after two of Beit Awwa's new councilmen were twice rebuffed by Amman when they tried to register the council and ask for financial help.

The Joint Committee, set up by the Baghdad Arab summit conference in late 1978 to fund projects in the occupied territories, has been a favorite target of league spokesmen. Muhammed Dudeen (Mustafa's brother) and the Hebron League's 'agricultural consultant' criticized the Joint Committee during an Israeli Radio interview last December, saying the committee diverted the majority of its funds into the pockets of some beneficiaries. "The villages lack the least benefits of civilization because they are neglected by the Joint Committee which gives moral and material support for cities only."

The Joint Committee represents the only sizeable Palestinian-nationalist source of project funding from outside the occupied territories. As such, its efforts are impeded at every turn by the occupation authorities. Villagers that oppose the league are punished by being forbidden to travel to Amman for consultation with Joint Committee members and money transfers from Amman to the West Bank are regularly denied by the Israeli authorities.

STEADFASTNESS MONEY CHOKED

The reimplementation of military order 284 (see page 16) also affects the economic situation of the villages. By banning West Bank leaders from meeting PLO officials, it potentially blocks Palestinian financial support from entering the West Bank.

The Joint Committee, set up to encourage steadfastness against the occupation, does not approve funding to villages which are cooperating with the Village League. In the Hebron area alone, Dudeen has worked out an arrangement whereby the military authorities supply 80 percent of the budget of a village which does not receive Joint Committee money, rather than the normal 50 percent. In this way villages are financially rewarded for giving up 'steadfastness' money.

Besides receiving funding from the military government, the league claims that it receives financial assistance for village projects from 'American volunteer agencies.' However, Dr. Amin al-Khatib, chairman of the Union of Charitable Associations in the West Bank, is convinced that, "the Hebron Village League doesn't receive any financial support from outside the occupied territories." And by Dudeen's own admission he has not yet received any money from the foreign voluntary agencies that operate in the West Bank.

Recently all charitable organizations, particularly Christian missions, that plan developmental agricultural projects in villages have been pushed by the

authorities to contact Dudeen's League. They have been asked not to visit any village without a representative of the League and to coordinate all planned projects with them. There have also been attempts to drag private voluntary agencies into unwittingly recognizing the league by funding projects partially financed by military-league sources.

PROPPING UP MIDDLEMEN

Although there are only about 500 members of the league from a population of 120,000 Mustafa Dudeen has been given virtual administrative authority over the Hebron district population. Any dealings before carried out directly with the military authorities, now must be signed and approved through the Hebron League. This has taken enormous power and prestige away from the elected village councils and has substituted a middleman structure.

ID renewals, summer visit permits, community projects, exit visas, *haj* pilgrimages, government employment — all must be processed through the league building. Family reunions, 15 at a time, are announced from time to time on Israeli TV as 'accepted with the strong recommendation of Mustaf Dudeen. Likewise Hebron area residents can find themselves demoted or out of a job if they oppose Dudeen's empire too loudly. Four teachers have been transferred to other schools after they registered their opposition to the league. For example, a former headmaster of a Yatta school must now commute to Bethlehem to keep his job as sports

teachers, thanks to Mustafa Dudeen.

The league operates from a substantial building on the outskirts of the city of Hebron. Although scores of men stroll in and out of the offices, village association spokesmen claim only three paid staff members — a secretary, a clerk and a typist — and no capital funds. All others, including Mustafa himself, work on a volunteer basis; they are almost all landed gentry. "In our association we have no money. We are a link between the village councils, the governor and the people."

LEAGUE STRUCTURE

With every appearance of being a regional council, the league's activities are administered by a central committee comprised of three members of a half dozen committees with wide responsibilities. An educational committee, for example, has made a survey of the area's school facilities. Thirteen schools are under construction or have been completed in the past year. A health committee has planned health clinics in the four central towns: Yatta, Tarqumia, Beit Ummar, and Beit Awwa as well as smaller clinics in each village.

The major effort of the association has been in the field of agriculture, to make farming more productive for West Bank landowners, they say, but also to ensure a steady supply of good quality inexpensive crops for Israeli markets. But all of the League's successes are due to military government support. Dudeen, for example, can distribute chemical fertilizers at lower than market prices because of

military government subsidies. With project approval and funding assured, the major obstacles to village development are thrown aside.

The technical committee chair, electrical engineer Mohammed Nasser, described the League's unique 'joint committee.' It consists of the military governor and his assistant, Mustafa Dudeen, the League committee involved with the project under discussion and officers from the village concerned. The spirit of cooperation between military and Palestinian residents in the League is unknown elsewhere in the West Bank.

NATIONALISTS IN OPPOSITION

The League has been fought hard by the Hebron municipality and many villages in the area. Graffiti denouncing the league has been scrawled on walls in Dhariya, Dura and Beit Awwa saying, "No to the Village League," "The PLO is our sole, legitimate representative." Jordan has denied any relationship with the Village League and has said that it is part of Israeli plans to break up the national unity in the West Bank, even though League leaders cling tenaciously to a Jordanian identity.

West Bank national leaders have deplored the division the League has sought to create between cities and villages, while Dudeen thinks that the municipalities have overstepped their authority, that they want to govern both villages and towns. He criticizes the municipalities for being involved in political activities. "According to the

law," he says, "the municipalities are in charge of services, civilian services, within the boundaries of the city. This is their job and that's all."

Every national figure, municipality, and institution in the West Bank has publicly denounced the league in speeches, newspapers and in meetings with village leaders. The Village Association has received generous condemnation from outside as well. The PLO regularly warns Dudeen on *Voice of Palestine* broadcasts to cease his activities. In a recent interview with *Ai Fajr*, Fatah Central Council member Abu Jihad (Khalil Wazir) said: "We consider Mustafa Dudeen, because of his suspicious activities, to be a traitor to his people. He is tying the people to the Israeli intelligence service and pressuring them to serve only Israeli policy. His actions are followed by the PLO outside and condemned by the leadership and by all of our people inside."

Last week Mustafa Dudeen, in the name of the Hebron Village League, attended the Tel Aviv reception given by Egypt's Ambassador to Israel, Mortada, on the occasion of the anniversary of Egypt's July 23 revolution. Representatives from the Hebron League's new offshoots in Ramallah and Bethlehem also attended the affair. The presence of the three represent a political plum for the Israeli military authorities and a sweet reward for their efforts to groom an alternative to the PLO on the West Bank — however temporary and however unpopular.

[Text]

Following in the pattern of the village league in Hebron the embryo Ramallah *rabeta*, or association of villages, is attempting to convince area villagers of its 'nationalist purpose' in order to draw them onto its official registers. This tactic has not much hope, however, since the three leagues — in Hebron, Ramallah and Bethlehem — have been openly denounced by virtually all nationalist figures and organizations in the West Bank.

Like its southern model and counterpart, the Ramallah league has sought support most intensively from mukhtars and sheikhs, the traditional civil and religious leaders in the villages. In their campaign for legitimacy, the league has the 'advantage' of being supported by the Israeli military government which can wave powerful threats in front of the traditional leaders in order to push them towards co-operation.

Even before the league opened its doors in Ramallah for official business six months ago, the mukhtars of the district were summoned to the occupa-

headquarters in Beit El for a message from the military authorities: no projects would be approved, no help would be given to any village unless processed through the Ramallah Village League.

The Israeli authorities have backed up their suggestions with a number of actions directed at forcing individual support for the league. In the over 100 villages within the boundaries of Ramallah district, mukhtars have been told to support the league or their official stamps (for notarizing papers) would be confiscated, making the mukhtar virtually powerless in the community.

This spring the proud mukhtars were taken aside at military checkpoints on the Ramallah-Jerusalem road, their names ticked off a list in the hands of Israeli officers, and asked whether they were league supporters. Last month a prominent sheikh known for his refusal to deal with the league was called for an interview with the military governor and personally told to end his opposition to the league's leaders. In a few cases these tactics have worked to instill some fear, and with it reluctant support of the association of villages. But at the same time it has been a clear signal to most villagers that this scheme of binding villages in an administrative structure has the open blessing of the military governor.

IS 40 MILLION

The league, while espousing benefits for Palestinian residents of the West Bank and working under the wings of the military governors, has not gone far to win the confidence of villagers. Many who initially put their signatures to the league's by-laws later pulled out. They published statements such as: "We, the mukhtars of Beitunia Haj Fowzi Diab Salah, the mukhtar of Ein Arik Naji Issa Hanna Bata, and Mukhtar of Ein Kimia Mohammed Yusuf Ahmed, announce to our people inside and outside that all associations and leagues of villages hurt the public and national interest. We publicly announce that we have no ties with such a league and any signature of ours is to be considered cancelled."

The organizer of the Ramallah league nucleus is a mukhtar himself in Bil'in, a small village near the so-called 'green line.' Yusuf al-Khatib, or Abu Jamil as he is locally known is a medium

sized landowner and prosperous by village standards. He and his sons are about to open their third retail furniture store in the Ramallah district.

Khatib's eldest son, Jamil, described how his father became involved in the league idea. "We heard about the Hebron association," he said in his version, "and we wanted something similar. Before village projects were not well funded and couldn't get approved. Now the military government can support us." The Ramallah league, Khatib admitted to the pro-Israeli daily *al-Anba*, has received IS 40 million from military sources for projects for which they will be middlemen.

Khatib's league, like its Hebron inspiration, has financial and military support but lacks the respect of village inhabitants. Opposition is strongest in Khatib's home village of Bil'in where people know him best, just as Mustafa Dudeen — the Hebron league's head — has met his toughest adversaries in his hometown of Dura.

At a meeting Khatib held in early February in Bil'in he told the villagers that they should submit an application requesting electrification, water lines, a clinic and a road between Bil'in and Kharbata, the next village to the north. None of the Bil'in inhabitants agreed to Abu Jamil's suggestions, including the two mukhtars of the village. One resident summed up local reaction by saying, "We are afraid of the autonomy aims of the village."

When faced with criticism by nationalists, Jamil defends his father: "These are only rumours. We are not a high authority, we are not qualified. We are villagers." He adds, mechanically, "We believe the PLO is the sole legitimate representative."

Despite such statements area residents think differently about the Khatib's political persuasions and the nature of the village association. A small land-owner calls the rabata "a branch of the military government." Another local resident, a lawyer, said the league is "only a changing of faces" from the occupation authorities.

Yusuf al-Khatib's efforts to knit together Ramallah villages under his authority are opposed even by the politically unsophisticated. By exploiting family rivalries to gain support, the league creates problems among villagers. The meetings at Beit El to pressure the mukhtars plus the strong reaction of the Arabic press and national figures, has succeeded in pointing out the close relationship the Ramallah league has with the military governor.

BAD SKELETON

The reputation of the first village league, Mustafa Dudeen's Hebron association, also warned villagers about what to expect when the league proliferated to Ramallah. "The skeleton of the league is bad," says one man in Ramallah who has known Abu Jamil all his life. "It is known to be full of spies," he says accusingly.

Private voluntary organizations, who find development projects in the West Bank, are trying to avoid dealing with the

league despite the pressure from the occupation authorities. The organizations fear their credibility in the West Bank will suffer if they are seen to deal with them. One agency found out—too late—that it was sharing the cost of a project with money put up by the military government through a league man.

Like Dudeen who served in the British, Egyptian and Jordanian governments, Khatib also has a long history of working with the occupation armies in the West Bank. He was an officer in the British army and when Jordan took over the West Bank he often entertained officers at his village house. He is accused of helping the Jordanians take taxes from fellow villagers by force, among other activities.

His associations and his latest actions are beginning to mobilize villagers in an organized way against him. Locals feel Khatib is being pushed now to do the dirty work for the military government which prefers indirect involvement in, for example, land sales. The questionable sale of over 700 dunums of land near Bil'in, and next to a settlement, had been arranged through the league's leaders. The sale allegedly involved forged documents and falsified papers to transfer cultivated village land to an Israeli real estate agent. A civil court in Ramallah stopped the sale and is looking into the details of the sale.

Meanwhile, Abu Jamil has been going to and from his village for the last two weeks under the armed protection of Israeli military patrols. Villagers suspect that he has received serious threats.

ABNA' AL-BALAD PROTEST ARRESTS

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 26 Jul-1 Aug 81 p 5

[Text] These days, the Zionist authorities are escalating their suppressive measures against the Palestinian masses in the country and in exile. These suppressive measures which have been continuous for decades take different forms and shapes.

For more than a year, northern district commander, General Ben Gal, well known for his enmity to anything Arab, issued restriction orders for a number of active members of Abna Al-Balad and the Student National Progressive Movement effectively banning them from leaving their villages or cities, from leaving their houses at night, and ordering them to report to the police daily. The orders give the police authority to break into their houses to make sure they are at home.

After one year of town restrictions, the abovementioned general issued new orders against four Abna Al-Balad activists Ghassan Fawzi Aghbarieh, Mohammed Salameh, Raja Aghbarieh and Hasan Ahmad Jabarin, as well as lawyer Ibrahim Nassar from Jerusalem and Faraj Khneifes from Shafa Amr.

Israel police also arrested two university students from Um Al Fahm, Jamal Ahmad

Mahajneh and Ali Mohammad Mahajneh on July 13 and Qadri Abu Wassel from Ar'ara. All detainees have revealed that their interrogation concentrates on their political ideas. They condemn the arrests as political revenge.

All this is at the same time a campaign directed against the Abna Al-Balad movement which includes falsification of its political position.

There have also been attacks on nationalist students in the universities especially in Jerusalem. There three have already been expelled and others are waiting for trial, accused of violating the Tamir Law.

Imposing town arrests based on Mandatory Emergency Regulations restricts freedom of our activists and cuts their source of income and aims to stop them from continuing the struggle to defend their people's rights.

The Abna Al-Balad movement is deeply aware that these suppressive campaigns against active members is a link in the chain of an overall policy to suppress our people everywhere, and also extends to hit all Arab nations.

We will confront this aggression on the popular and legal levels, and we will continue defending our basic freedom; respect for our dignity and freedom of expression.

We call upon all national forces and Jewish democratic forces to stand by us in one united active bloc to stop the fascist attack on us.

But despite the fascist aggression the Palestinian people will not submit to Zionist brutality and will not cede its national rights: the right of return, of self-determination and to a national independent state on the national soil under the leadership of the PLO, its sole and legitimate representative.

- * We demand the cancellation of town arrests and cancellation of emergency regulations;
- * We demand immediate release for (administrative) detainees;
- * We demand the return of the expelled university students to their studies;
- * We demand a stop to racist incitement and an end to barbarism.

Together on the Path. Progressive National Movement, Abna Al-Balad Movement and popular groups.

BRIEFS

MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS--50 Jewish students between the ages of 18-26 from various countries began pre-military training, July 26, in the first camp of its kind for foreign supporters of the state of Israel. The students will be trained in the use of weapons, first aid, marksmanship and map-reading in a youth corps base and will be trained for, among other things, guard duties in border settlements. The course, which lasts one month, is organized by the Jewish Agency with the cooperation of the military. Some of the youths are students in religious schools. The main reason cited for the fact that the training is only pre-military and not purely military is that that "might cause problems with the authorities in their native countries." [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 2-8 Aug 81 p 4]

BIRTH, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE RATES--There was a substantial drop in the birth rate among the Jewish population in the last decade, as well as a deterioration in the general employment situation. There was also a similar decline in the incomes of various population sectors, primarily of young and old people. This emerges from data compiled by the Labor and Social Welfare Ministry during the years 1969 to 1979. In that period, the Jewish population grew by 28.4 percent, whereas the non-Jewish population grew by 46 percent. Emigration reached 126,464 people, with the peak year being 1974, with 25,664 people leaving the country. Marriage rates have declined by 12.6 percent whereas divorce rates went up by 45.3 percent, especially between 1974 and 1979. [TA111410 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Aug 81 p 2]

JULY COST OF LIVING--The cost of living index went up in July by 6.1 percent. Items that had notable price-hikes are housing, by 13.5 percent; health, by 8.6 percent; and furniture, by 5.6 percent. The rate of annual inflation is now reaching a little more than 100 percent. Since the beginning of this year prices went up by 48 percent, as against 56 percent during a parallel period last year. [Text] [TA141216 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 14 Aug 81]

NABULUS BUDGET--Nabulus, 18 Aug--Nabulus Mayor Bassam ash-Shak'ah has stated that the deficit in the municipality's budget this year has already reached 13 million shekels--despite the municipality's revenues which to date total 84 million shekels. He noted that the municipality had recently approached the military government to cover this deficit through grants, in order not to disrupt local projects. Ash-Shak'ah asserted that in view of this state of affairs the municipality would soon be unable to function, and would not be able to honor its commitments to implement development projects. He was critical of the authorities' recent refusal to allow the support funds from the Arab countries--on which the municipalities had relied in drawing up their budgets--to be brought in. The military government has informed the ITIM correspondent that the question of bringing money into the area is still under examination. [Text] [TA181016 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 0920 GMT 18 Aug 81]

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

DEFENSE, INTERIOR MINISTERS APPOINTED

EA301554 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 30 Aug 81

[Text] Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council and chairman of the Council of Ministers, today issued two Supreme People's Council decrees regarding the appointments of a defense minister and an interior minister.

Article 1 of the first decree provides for the appointment of [Interior Minister] Colonel Salih Muslih Qasim, member of the Central Committee, as defense minister. The remaining articles provide for the annulment of any previous appointment to the post, the decree becoming effective from the date of issue, and for its publication in the official gazette.

Article 1 of the second decree provides for the appointment of [Deputy Defense Minister] Lt Col Muhammad Abdullah al-Batani, candidate member of the Central Committee, as interior minister. The remaining articles provide for the annulment of any previous appointments to the post, the decree becoming effective from the date of issue, and for its publication in the official gazette.

Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad also issued a Supreme People's Council decree regarding the appointment of a member of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council. Article 1 of the decree provides for the appointment of brother Sulayman Nasir Muhammad, member of the Central Committee [and head of the Organization of People's Defense Committee] as member of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council. The remaining articles of the decree provide for its becoming effective from the date of issue and its publication in the official gazette.

CSO: 4304/148

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

CHAIRMAN RECEIVES IRAQI CP LEADER

EA072240 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 7 Sep 81

[Text] Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party Central Committee, chairman of the Supreme People's Council Presidium and chairman of the Council of Ministers, has stressed the concern of the YSP and Democratic Yemen for the importance of consolidating the Arab liberation struggle against imperialism and zionism, enhancing the cohesiveness of the Arab national liberation movements and expanding and promoting relations with the countries of the socialist community, headed by the USSR, and all the forces of good in the world. He said this when he received Comrade 'Aziz Muhammad, secretary general of the Iraqi Communist Party at his office this morning.

The meeting, which was dominated by an atmosphere of cordiality, reviewed relations between the fraternal YSP and the Iraqi Communist Party and the current situation and developments in the Arab homeland. The position of the Arab national liberation movements was also discussed, as well as issues facing the region and other issues of common interest, including confrontation with imperialism, zionist and reactionary challenges to the struggle of our Arab peoples, above all the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people for self-determination.

Replying, Comrade 'Aziz Muhammad told brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad he was pleased to be visiting Democratic Yemen and meeting the YSP secretary general. He also praised our country's achievements at all levels and the prominent part played by its revolutionary experience, which had won the support and backing of all the world's revolutionaries. Comrade 'Aziz Muhammad expressed pride and satisfaction at the militant bonds linking the friendly YSP and the Iraqi Communist Party.

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SAUDI ARABIA

RIYADH COMMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN, USSR

LD291920 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 29 Aug 81

[Commentary by Hashim Abdu Hashim]

[Text] The Afghan issue is arousing numerous and important questions, the main one of which is: What has happened to make the Soviet Union agree, through the Kabul regime, to discuss the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the framework of a committee comprising India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan after the Soviets earlier rejected this proposal as well as the European initiatives put forward by Lord Carrington when he visited the Soviet Union recently?

What happened to cause this noticeable change in a stand that seemed impossible for the Soviets to back down from or for Babrak Karmal's regime to agree with. The Soviet pretext for rejecting this proposal was that tackling the Afghan issue in this manner would mean admitting the existence of an illegal situation in the country after the Soviets had entered the country following Karmal's advent to power--or rather, they installed him there. How has the situation changed and why has their stringent attitude turned into sudden acceptance? Surely the Soviets, who are known for their caution, their slowness in their decision-making, and their patience, have now found themselves facing difficult options after the international community saw them as invaders and as a power threatening world security and stability. These options are: Firstly, freezing their actions in all fields in order to avoid more opposition from the world community in exchange for slow gains in other parts of the world. Secondly, continuing the policy of containing the situation in Poland or abandoning it for keeping Afghanistan and concentrating their efforts in that direction. Thirdly, continuing to support regimes which are implementing its strategy in different parts of the world, or to stop this form of tactic in exchange for calming world anxiety and gaining its increasing confidence.

Yet it appears that the Soviet Union cannot neglect its strategic positions in Poland, Angola, or in the Horn of Africa. The Soviet Union is also not ready to leave the Middle East in exchange for unlimited troubles in Afghanistan.

After years of occupation of this Islamic country, the Soviet Union has discovered that it has committed a strategic error. It believed that it could jump into Afghanistan's neighboring countries and could exploit Afghanistan in temporary circumstances to make new gains. For that, it accepted risking its reputation, spending millions and sacrificing scores of soldiers. When it discovered that it could not achieve any expansionist objectives it began stirring trouble in

Poland, waiting for the appropriate chance to spring, despite the warnings it received from all countries of the world. To us it seems nothing but a matter of time; otherwise, for what reason is the Soviet fleet sailing near Poland these days?

The Soviets have chosen to temporarily freeze the situation, in Afghanistan, to reassure its neighbors and to contain the explosive situation there. At the same time they are seeking to implement their designs--known as the policy of encirclement of what they call foreign interests--through setting up a number of alliances and blocks, aimed at disturbing ranks from within and diverting attention away from the expected adventures in Poland and Angola.

The Arab and Islamic nation, while drawing attention to the danger of what is happening, reaffirms that the region's leaderships and people's awareness cannot be exploited in any way just to paint a pretty picture of the Soviets in face of the facts, and the nation's issues and major interests.

The Arab and Islamic nation draws attention to this and warns that what is happening in Afghanistan does not constitute a retreat. Rather it indicates that preparations for a huge adventure are being hatched by the Soviets who are waiting for the appropriate chance. However, these moves do not frighten anybody, do not influence the nation's thoughts, and do not change the convictions of Arabs and Muslims who find in the Soviet Union a number of ambitions that should not be underrated. Whether the Soviet Union wants to impose itself on the area and its issues, or to achieve more of its own interests, the Soviet Union and those who support it should realize that the times of deceiving this nation have gone, and the question of knowing friends from foes has become a strategic objective for the peoples of the area. There is no room left for outbidding and temptation.

CSO: 4304/148

SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

SAUDI NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT REPRESENTATION--Jiddah, 24 Aug (SPA)--Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal has stated that Deputy Prime Minister and Crown Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz will lead the kingdom's delegation to the summit conference on the North-South dialogue to be held in Mexico in October. In a statement to the newspaper AL-MADINAH, published here today, Prince Sa'ud said that the conference is intended for consultation only and not for negotiation so that the largest measure of mutual understanding may be achieved. Referring to the foreign ministers conference of countries participating in the North-South dialogue summit held earlier this month in Mexico, Prince Sa'ud said that the foreign ministers have approved the principles and ideas which constitute the kingdom's position at the conference and have adopted them as a basis for the summit conference's work.
[Text] [Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1050 GMT 24 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/148

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

OPPOSITION FRONT OFFICIAL REPORTS ON FIGHTING

LD071018 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0735 GMT 7 Sep 81

[Text] Kuwait, 7 Sep (KUNA)--A senior official of a front which is opposing the ruling regime in North Yemen was quoted here as saying today that the forces of the front have been fighting a war for more than 4 weeks against forces belonging to the army in the central region of the country.

The Kuwaiti paper AS-SIYASAH says that the official in charge of foreign relations of the National Democratic Front, Mr Yahya al-Shami, said in Aden that the Sana government had sent in seven army battalions in its campaign against the front, a campaign that now enters its 4th week, and which is one of the biggest in the history of the 12-year-old conflict between the authorities in North Yemen and the national front.

Mr al-Shami added that Sana's plan is not isolated from the fierce, wide-scale international game to which the region at large is being subjected, and which is meant to bring under control the central region where the forces of the front and the North Yemen forces are present, a region not far from the border with South Yemen.

He said that the national front, which is supported by Aden, had so far not raised the slogan of toppling the ruling authority in Sana. The front, he said, was striving to foil the attempts made to liquidate it, and centered its efforts on finding how best to lay the foundations of security, stability and democracy, so that the authorities may meet the democratic demands of the front.

The opposition front official, on the other hand, accused the Sana government of violating an agreement reached in Aden between the two sides and which called for a cease-fire from 10 August. He said the front was surprised to see the now 4-week-old campaign become fiercer, more violent and on a larger scale with no indication as to whether North Yemen wants to halt it.

He said that the military campaign had resulted in hundreds of dead, hundreds of arrests, homes destroyed and families driven out of their houses in the region. He stressed that the army was able to occupy some heights in the region but a fierce battle is now raging in the Eastern sector. The forces of his front, he said, were able to check the advance of the army in the Western sector, to destroy and disperse the first infantry battalion, and to weaken the 8th commando battalion.

On the other hand, the front issued orders for its forces throughout the country to step up their operations.

Mr al-Shami said that the Sana government had tried to discuss the activity of the front with Aden, but that the latter had told it that the national front was present in the North before being in Democratic Yemen.

CSO: 4304/148

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

PDRY WAR COLLEGE VISITED--Interior Minister Lt Col 'Ali Muhammad 'Uthrub and his military delegation, who are participating in the celebrations marking the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the armed forces in the southern part of the homeland, today visited the war college in Aden. They were welcomed by the college commander, its officers and training staff. Lt Col 'Ali Muhammad 'Uthrub became acquainted with the various training practices and activities at the college. Lieutenant Colonel 'Uthrub also attended a tactical exercise carried out by the college's students. The college commander delivered a speech in which he welcomed the interior minister and his delegation and briefed them on the history of the college. Then Lt Col 'Ali 'Uthrub delivered a speech in which he conveyed greetings and congratulations from leader President Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih and all elements of our armed forces and security forces to the officers, NCO's and students of the college. He expressed his admiration for the high level of studies at the war college. At the end of his visit, Lt Col 'Ali 'Uthrub signed the visitor's book in which he expressed his happiness at this visit. He stressed that this college is one of the numerous accomplishments of the 14 October and 26 September revolutions. [Text] [JN021756 San'a' Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 2 Sep 81]

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